Page 5, Para 1. a. b. & c.,

These paragraphs lump the "seeking of scientific proof" and "application results" together and effectively display both in an unfavorable light. The first sentence of paragraph c., clearly state that the commitee has been "persuaded" that "effects attributed to the RV phenomena exist under unexplained circumstances."... and then state these effects have not been adequately documented. This would leave me with a decidedly negative outlook when the first sentence of paragraph d is read; "even when granted the existance of the phenomena...." Either the phenomena exists or it doesn't! Negative double talk.

Yes

Good point!!

Page 5, Para 2. b.,

This entire paragraph is deliberately and destructively negative. It would leave one to believe that perhaps the personnel involved in this study were not quite as open minded or objective as they would have themselves appear. A more positive way of stating the same thing giving nothing "subjective" would have been; "Operational programs, that by their very existance assume RV as a reality, may produce [redacted] valuable results of a subjective nature even though objective proof of RV

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existence may not presently be achievable."

Page 6, para 2c.,

Sentence in paren's is another prime example of dedicated, narrow-view, destructiveness and lack of objectivity. If this statement is true, then it would be better said — and far more objective to say; ("Removing these deficiencies would enable a more effective investigation for proof or quantification of the RV phenomena.)" If these deficiencies are that compounding then it has not proven the non-existence of RV phenomena either — but the negative flow of this report would suggest to the reader that the committee has attempted to accomplish this since the outset.

Page 6, para 2.d.,

Again; applications area and Scientific study area are lumped together here. It is also not very objective to generalize Management in such a way. They (diversity of projects) probably have ranged from some problems to grossly miss-managed. If this is true; then it would only be fair to address specific problems of a severe nature — by project, in the summary — and make sure the difference of review between Scientific & applications is specifically maintained.

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Page 6, para 3.a.(2).,

Again a very negative statement! "... that previous research has established substantial knowledge of what not to do." Para 1.a., page 5 is in direct contravention to this statement. If nothing has been "conclusively established," then how can such a statement be made. If none of the "proof" to date is creditable — then how can you establish what has been done wrong! Very, very negative.

Page 7, para 3.b.,

I am not a scientist, but it appears to me that Objectively speaking when direct human interaction occurs in an experiment and a control group is not possible — there will exist a great degree of variance in the quality of data. (i.e., just by virtue that one human being draws differently or has a different ~~[illegible]~~ vocabulary will effect this.

~~Page 8, para 5.a.,~~

~~If anyone in the committee~~

Page 8, para 5.b.,

Didn't know this was a desired result wanted from the committee. Was a "unifying parapsychological concept" question raised!? If not — why include it; it's flak!

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Page 10, para 3.a.,

Why scientific members on the operational oversight committee? Appears to me that these would be intelligence requirements and not scientific.

Page 11, para 3.c.,

What should useful data be attributed too.... "Parapsychological Phenomena in general." or what??! If there is an answer to this question — then the committee should have recognized formally "that there is some kind of phenomena occurring!"

Page 23, para 6.

This, I assume, is where information for Para 5.b., page 8, came from. If this is true — then it has been twisted (again to the negative) just a bit in its quoting.

Page 26, para 4.b.,

I am sure the transcripts do contain cues! That is precisely what the remote viewer is intending to provide a judge — a match by cue is just as valid as a match by drawing.

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Page 27/ para 4.b.(1).,

Believe it Naive to assume statistical significance as lack of proof. Such a statement as written in the report is only one of many parochial'isms in the scientific world; and you will find as many who believe in as object too "statistical proof." (i.e., use of drugs to cure disease is based on statistics results). Their statement is not very objective. Statistics do provide some proof — certainly a lack of statistics underscores a lack of proof.

Page 27, para 4.b.(2).,

This leads me to believe that this is how it has been reported — and this is not the case. These tests have been repeated, and by more than one person.

Page 27, para 4.b.(4).,

This is not very clear. One reading this would think "all" data was screened for a significant result. But in fact, SRI, does their screening in groups. Significance by each group of sessions. They have shown significance by both sub-group (six sessions) as well as overall (total groups). Believe this is a bias, miss-leading, and negative statement.

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Page 27, para 4.6.(5).,

This paragraph could have all the words "positive" and "negative" inter-exchanged and applicably describe this report in its entirety. Negative results have been provided, recorded, reported — don't understand why this report would have us feel differently. They have failed in every case to present "positive" statements of any sort in their findings — not very objective.

Page 27, para 5.,

Believe the entire committee missed a very important point here . . . the statistical analysis in the case of SRI reports is based on the quality of data (interpretation), not the other way around. Interpretation by the judge is what causes the match of target RV'd to real probable target — and on the bases of those matches — the statistical data is produced. Actually, if this committee had understood this, then we would be faced with claims that the data evaluated for statistical significance was "... obviously done subjectively and not objectively," therefore invalidating all of the data. Sort of a catch 22. There is no right way for this committee.

(Continued next page)

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agree with the statement "... the burden of proof lies with those who advocate the existence of any paranormal phenomena!" The committee agrees with something existing – but not the RV effect (RE: para's 1.c., & 1.d., page 5). This makes this para kind of contraversial. What is clear, is the Reviewers also ... owe the community at least the effort to maintain objective ~~[illegible]~~ neutrality – but it appears that was not done.

Page 28-31, para 2 & 5.d.,

"although they have not yet done so, the Soviets may very well be the first to identify the field forces involved, and the means by which they are generated, ..."

"... the data available from reliable researchers are highly significant."

The above quotes from this chapter clearly illustrate the positive approach in view point which the committee has concerning the Russian efforts where even less documentation exists than in the effort here at home where they have repeatedly been very negative. Does this imply the Russians are right and we are wrong – sounds awfully subjective to me.

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Page 34, para 1.c.,

Particularly with regard to this committee! Thought they were selected as open minded and non-biased.

Page 34, para 1.d.,

Thought there were no "replicative studies" as previously determined by this document. They say it here though!?{ Wish they'd get their facts straight. (RE: Chapter 8, para 3; para's (1), (2), (4), and (5) page 27, etc. etc.)

Page 35, para 1.f.,

Why were only criticisms said here. There have been notable people who have acclaimed their work as well. Again — the narrow, subjective, evaluations shine through.

Page 35, para 1.g.,

"... which appears to be well planned and executed." What is implied here!? If one has developed the negative attitude in reading this document by the time he gets to this point — this implies "fraud!" Very poorly done!

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Page 35, para 2.a.(2).,

So what if a RV'er visits a target more than once? It appears that is precisely the attitude for defining resolution that may be needed. Don't understand their comments here – which are clearly made at least out of context and therefore unfairly.

Page 36, para 2.b.(1).,

No where in this paragraph do they explain their problem! What does anything said – have to do with the actual Remote Viewing of a specific target.

Page 36, para 2.b.(3).,

What affect does feedback have on the accuracy of the remote viewers sketches or previous taped session?? This is not very clear.

Page 36, para 2.b.(4).,

order of evaluation – selection of judges – reason for judge selection – "best" judge selection – definition of target – etc. None of the above should discredit whether a match was made of six targets to six RV sessions correctly. The probability of chance still exists – and the "significant" result will still occur. To discredit the result based on any of the above is superfluous to the results significance.

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Page 37, para 2.c.,

Clearly the point has been missed. What is implied here is that a form of cheating is taking place. If a remote viewer has six aircraft targets in a row; and there is a significant match statistically; then statistically it should be of even higher value since the probability of getting six aircraft in a row is, alone very significant with relation to the target pool. Believe the judging schemes utilized at SRI are not fully understood by the committee.

Page 37, para 2.d.(1).,

This paragraph statements clearly imply cheating, fraud, etc., in the way it is written — with inuendos etc. e.g., "... appear to change." What kind of remark is that! They do or they don't. The above is a direct attack on the reputation of a researcher and not his work — not a very professional or objective approach. It almost ~~smacks~~ smacks of vindictivism!

Page 38, para 2.d.(2).,

So what! If the description matched 1,000 locations. Point in fact is — that from the entire earth — the description matched the target! Instead of an island, a boat, etc.

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Page 39, para 3.c.(3).,
Shouldn't they list a couple. I think their way would be even less creditable than RV assumption – because I don't believe they understand protocol of how long distance targets were done. I'd challenge them on this.

Page 40, para 5.c.,
Appears the last sentence here does not coincide with their previous statements concerning validity of statistical findings !!

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(2)

1. ~~para 2b, pg 5~~
   ~~– a sideways cut at INSCOM.~~

2. para 2d, pg 6
   – I have to agree.

3. para 2f, pg 6
   – The committee found no fraudulent intent – yet they sure take swipes at SRI/Russ Targ!!

4. para 3b, pg 7
   – they are looking for "proof" of PSI. I agree that statistical improbability doesn't cut it from our point of view. Ultimately, our quality requirements will be (if they are not already) even more demanding than mere replicability and statistical improbability. We need high correlation each time.

5. para 4a, pg 7
   – I thought in para 2c, pg 2, they said there was "considerably less controversy from point of view of measurement techniques" re. PK.

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6. para 5c, pg. 8
   — Should we suggest that the Committee structure a program?
      -- They are the know-it-alls.
      -- They have the credibility??
      -- They meet requirements of paras 2 b, c, d*
      -- why not have them organize and structure a protocol/program?

7. para 6b., pg 8
   — This is a grand supposition in the greatest sense - and worded negatively, to boot! Did we say that about agents, satellites, or radios? Each of those systems collects a lot of garbage that goes into file 13! But no one would say that fact under-mines their overall value ~~as~~ in intel applications!

8. para 1, pg 10.
   — I say again — task the GHE Committee to develop their "credible" approach.

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9. para 2, pg. 10
   - This contradicts para 7, pg 9 which says proof experiments and characterization experiments may occur simultaneously. in para 2, pg 10, they say characterization experiments should not occur until proof exists!

10. para 3 a. pg 10
   - Is the "false alarm rate" considered in assessing value of other systems? How about the vulnerability of other systems to deception - is deception a "false alarm rate" - I think it is.

11. para 3c., pg 10
   - what, pray tell, would it be attributable to, an "act of God?"

~~12. para 4, pg 10~~

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12. para 1, pg 11a

Minority opinion is full of shit!

"Since operational tests can occur with little warning" is flat erroneous. We are now conducting well planned long term penetrations of fixed targets. Not all RV operations are short fuze spontaneous missions - in fact, we all would prefer longer term operations. The dissenters use this erroneous assumption to say that all operations tests are uncontrolled and therefore not worthy of attempt.

"Such tests cannot be varied systematically" This is also an erroneous assumption. It is an untruth we can vary anything they damn well want, therefore a separate ops test element could do the same thing.

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Then, in para 2, they say that

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"even if these falsehoods were not falsehoods, it would probably provide little usable data any-way" This is the third false assumption used to promote a falsehood and then throttle any effort to prove their own minority opinion to be wrong through dissipation of enthusiasm.

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Scotty – my ideas

Correct

(1) I had been informed that we shared 90K of a 190K AMSAA contract! This data on pg 18 implies we have a 75K contract and AMSAA has (a separate) 190K contract!
Was my info wrong? What's up – it affects the POM words a whole lot.

(2) In discussing judging, I do not understand the negative aspect of cues in a transcript. The transcript is a product of the RVer, therefore it contains info derived from PSI, therefore it is validly judgeable and should be used in the overall judging effort. This is a viable statement only if the facilitator puts cues into the session (ie transcript)

This appears to say that only sketches should be judged but anything verbal from the Remote Viewer? should not – I dont understand.

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(3) This appears to be a non-statement. The main paragraph says it is an example of misuse of statistical analysis, but subpara (2) appears to give us "mom & apple pie" about repeatability. I don't understand the message here. If the logic used in sub-para (2) reflects a misuse of statistics (as it is supposed to), what constitutes a good use of statistics? To accept one result with no regard for repeatability? This is wrong and misleading wording.

(4) Amen

(5) Curious to note the article names the defendants but not the plaintiffs / prosecutors!

(6) Interesting that the attack to discredit is aimed at the 2nd sessions. It overlooks the possibility that

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having been (possibly) positively reinforced, more resolution was gained during "pyramiding" sessions than the first "raw run". (1) This *may* indicate a rather flanking attack against the concept of "pyramiding".
(2) It certainly highlights a favorable trend or prospect in a *negative* view instead of a positive, curious view.
(3) and doesn't address the simple human info processing system that once you've seen a picture, you can later go back and see more detail in it.

(7) No wonder! you may randomly bring in a control and find out he's gifted! Many more people can do this than the GHE Cmtee is willing to accept. If a ~~[illegible]~~ control comes in and blows ingo's socks off, how do you classify him the next time? This is not

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because it is difficult to ID psychics. It is because it is difficult to ID non-psychics!!

(8) They have a good point!

(9) Was there a handwriting analyst on the Gale Committee? This constitutes a real attempt at slander without the guts to make it specific!

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(10) "Appear to"!!! Again an attack based on innuendo and whispers. How do they change? This could simply mean that some were left out in one publication due to a limited reproduction frame or, to conserve space, may have been relocated in toto to a different quadrant of the sketch!!

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Does the handwriting change? Do the words change? These would be the important aspects of fraud.

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And besides, here they are only talking about "publications" not the original sketches. Did the Gale Committee review the originals in each case? Anything can look different after it is printed for mass consumption. It is the original data which counts.
Publishers also take certain license with their authors

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work, you know.

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(3)

22

~~Page 0~~

~~para~~

~~Page 0 — Special access program~~

~~page~~

— Page 4 → Para c

- Circumstances have been delineated and as humanly possible, controlled
- Results recorded
- Mathematical competition can be computed on anticipated results versus actual results.

— Page 5 Para 1c 1d

Welcome the skepticism but disagree with the conclusions drawn!

Page 5 Para 2 b

Onus should and will soon be to prove RV as unreal!

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Page 8 Para 5 b

— Why PK and the physical tangible proof.

— Is there not a ^scientific^ mathematical correlation correlating results in terms of probability and reality (results achieved under controlled condition).?

Page 10 Para 1

Suggest ~~[illegible]~~ "credible approaches" be defined and imposed (controlled) by the scientific community.

Page 10 Para 2

Incredibly stupid statement!

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Page 10 Para 3a 3b

Agree — Maintain RV on training basis

Page 11 Para 3c

should add "unless directly attributable to the (RV) phenomena" other-wise another stupid statement.

Page 11a Para 3

Reliability on the RV phenoma certainly should not exceed the percentile ratio of established mathematical success obtained under controlled conditions.

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